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Psychiatric injury in the workplace: Directions for cases involving stress 
or bullying 
 
Des Butler
*
 
The High Court in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd considered the liability of an employer for psychiatric 
injury from stress in the workplace. In so doing, it commented not only on foreseeability of psychiatric injury 
from stress, but also on the conduct of actions for an alleged breach of the employer's duties in relation to 
the employee's workload. This case informed the decision in New South Wales v Mannall, which concerned 
psychiatric injury from bullying in the workplace. This note considers both of these cases and suggests 
directions for cases involving other types of workplace bullying. 
 
1.  Introduction 
It has been 35 years since the High Court recognised in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey
1
 that an employer's 
duty of care towards his or her employee was not limited to cases of physical injury but also extended to 
cases of psychiatric injury. In the intervening years the claims for psychiatric injury in a workplace context 
that have been considered by Australian lower courts have not been restricted to those involving the plaintiff 
himself or herself being injured or imperilled,
2
 or witnessing the death, injury or imperilment of another.
3
 
Claims have included circumstances involving a less traumatic, but none the less still damaging, stressor 
arising in the workplace, such as bullying
4
 or workplace stress.
5
 The exact boundaries of the last of these 
claims -- workplace stress -- has always had the prospect of being problematic since it raises a number of 
potentially conflicting issues, including whether compensation is appropriate where the amount or type of 
work is undertaken voluntarily, whether all employees should be treated equally and whether certain amounts 
or types of work should be deemed in some way a 'normal' expectation with greater amounts deemed 
excessive or harmful. 
 
The High Court has recently had the opportunity to state its position on different types of psychiatric injury, 
including claims by so-called 'primary' victims
6
 and 'secondary' victims.
7
 Now, in Koehler v Cerebos 
(Australia) Ltd,
8
 it has expressed its views in relation to common law claims for psychiatric injury arising 
from stress from overwork. In the process, the court may be seen to have continued its trend of emphasising 
greater personal responsibility, while disapproving of a practice that had developed at trial which focused 
primarily on the employer's common law duty in tort rather than contractual or statutory duties. Some of its 
statements may also be seen as having implications for other types of claims for psychiatric injury, such as 
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psychiatric injury resulting from bullying. In this connection, the NSW Court of Appeal in New South Wales 
v Mannall
9
 drew on pronouncements in the Koehler case. 
 
2. Stress from overwork: Koehler v Cerebos 
In Koehler v Cerebos the plaintiff was employed by the defendant company as a sales representative until she 
was retrenched. The company then re-hired her as a merchandising representative on a part-time basis, 
Monday to Wednesday, for a total of 24 hours each week. Despite her protests that she was required to visit 
too many stores in the time available, the company neither reduced the number of stores nor increased the 
plaintiff's work hours. Significantly, the plaintiff's complaints related only to her ability to do the work rather 
than any consequential health problems. The plaintiff reached a point where she felt as though she could not 
physically go on. She consulted her doctor complaining of aches and pains and difficulty in moving, thinking 
that she was having troubles from the physical side of her job. She was diagnosed as suffering from a 
psychophysical disorder called 'fibromyalgia syndrome'. After three months, anxiety and depression were 
thought to be complicating the plaintiff's condition and she was thereupon referred to a psychiatrist. At trial it 
was undisputed that the plaintiff was suffering from a recognisable psychiatric illness which had been caused 
by her work. 
 
The plaintiff claimed that her psychiatric condition had been caused by, alternatively, a breach by her 
employer of its common law duty to provide a safe system of work, a breach of an implied term of her 
employment contract, or a breach of a statutory duty based on the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 
(WA). In accordance with the practice of such claims the action was tried largely on the basis of the alleged 
breach of common law duty on the ground that no different issues were raised by the other two grounds. At 
trial the District Court Commissioner held that the plaintiff's workload was excessive; that with its 
knowledge of the industry and the particular workload of the plaintiff, the defendant employer required no 
particular expertise to foresee a risk of psychiatric injury to the plaintiff; and that the defendant employer had 
been free either to increase the plaintiff's hours or provide her with assistance. The defendant's failure to 
follow either course meant that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. On appeal the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the question of foreseeability was determinative. In this case, 
the employer was held to have no particular reason to foresee a specific risk of psychiatric injury to the 
plaintiff. The appeal was therefore allowed. 
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In the High Court, two judgments were delivered. The main judgment was a joint one by McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. Callinan J, while delivering a separate judgment, reached the same 
outcome as the joint judgment. The joint judgment made a point of noting the practice of pleading the three 
causes of action but conducting trials solely on the basis of the alleged breach of the employer's common law 
duty to provide a safe system of work. Since the case had been conducted in this fashion in the courts below, 
the joint judgment regarded itself as obliged to address its disposition in terms of the tortious claim only. On 
that basis, there were two grounds for regarding the claim to have been correctly dismissed by the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court: the plaintiff's agreement to perform the duties that were the cause of her psychiatric 
injury; and the absence of any reason for the defendant to foresee the risk of psychiatric injury in the 
circumstances. 
 
Plaintiff's agreement to perform assigned duties 
In this case, the joint judgment attributed only limited significance to the plaintiff's agreement to perform the 
assigned duties.
10
 It nevertheless noted that the plaintiff's agreement to perform the assigned duties was 
contrary to any contention that the defendant ought to have realised that performance of the tasks posed a 
risk to the plaintiff's psychiatric health. This was because her agreement to undertake the work not only 
evinced a willingness to try, but was also inconsistent with her entertaining a fear of danger to her health. In 
this context, the protests that the plaintiff made about performing the work within the time available did not 
at the time have the same significance that might be attributed to them in hindsight.
11
 Presumably, an 
agreement will have greater significance in circumstances where the risk of psychiatric harm is readily 
apparent to the employee, who nevertheless agrees to perform the work. Naturally no such apparent risk 
arose in the case at hand. 
 
In the view of the joint judgment, concepts such as 'overwork', 'excessive work' or the like could only have 
meaning if they had reference to some external standard, such as an industrial standard, or whether the 
amount of work was injurious to health.
12
 However, apart from the potential threat to legal coherency 
inherent on making the law dependent on outside control like industry-set standards, there was the matter of 
freedom of contract. Parties are entitled to contract as they choose, and they might freely choose that the 
employee is to work in excess of the industry standard amount, possibly in return for an increase in 
remuneration and/or advancement.
13
 It would be a 'large step' for the common law to inhibit the making of 
such agreements.
14
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Further, making performance subject to whether it might be injurious to health was also not without 
difficulty. Asking whether psychiatric harm could be sustained from performance of the work involved 
consideration of matters relevant to foreseeability. Certainly, Tame v New South Wales rejected 'normal 
fortitude' as a precondition to liability for a claim for psychiatric illness.
15
 The joint judgment would not 
entertain reintroducing the concept into the field of an employer's liability to employees so as to expect some 
conformity to a norm of health as a precondition. Instead, reasonable foreseeability remained the central 
question. 
 
No reason for defendant to foresee risk of psychiatric injury 
The joint judgment thought that while it may be possible to say that as a matter of general knowledge some 
recognisable psychiatric illness might be triggered by stress, it was a much larger step to say that all 
employers must now recognise that all employees are at risk of psychiatric injury from stress at work.
16
 Such 
an assumption seemed to lie behind the District Court Commissioner's conclusion concerning foreseeability. 
Instead, an employer will be liable if psychiatric injury to the particular employee is reasonably foreseeable. 
This will require consideration of the nature and extent of the individual employee's duties and any signs he 
or she may be displaying.
17
  
 
Accordingly, any attempt to make performance subject to whether the duties were injurious to psychiatric 
health contradicted two basic principles. First, an employer engaging an employee to perform certain duties 
is entitled to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary concerning the possibility of psychiatric 
injury, that the employee considers that he or she is able to do the job. Secondly, the obligations of the parties 
are fixed at the time of the contract unless they are later varied. It is contradictory, therefore, to seek to 
qualify the operation of the contract on the basis of information the employer later acquires about the 
employee's vulnerability. 
 
Here there was no reason for the defendant to suspect that the plaintiff was at risk of psychiatric injury. There 
was no indication of any particular susceptibility nor at the time did the plaintiff suggest she was vulnerable 
to psychiatric injury or that the work was putting her at risk of such injury. Her complaints had been directed 
only to the amount of work, rather than to any potential danger to her psychiatric health. Indeed, when she 
first consulted her doctor, both she and her doctor believed that her problems were physical rather than 
psychiatric.
18
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Callinan J delivered a judgment which was not dissimilar from the joint judgment in this respect. His Honour 
suggested that the plaintiff should fail at the threshold of foreseeability. He believed that it was far-fetched 
and therefore not reasonably foreseeable that a competent, seemingly well woman would suffer a disabling 
injury within six months of taking up a part-time position.
19
 He too thought it significant that no witnesses 
who observed the plaintiff perceived any changes in her personality or any psychiatric symptoms and neither 
she nor her doctor believed in the first instance that she was suffering from a psychiatric illness. 
 
Other observations: claims for psychiatric illness in the workplace 
These comments were sufficient to dispose of the case in hand. However, the significance of the case will 
also lie in obiter comments in relation to psychiatric claims arising from workplace injuries. The joint 
judgment in particular indicated its disagreement with the practice that had evolved of pleading in such cases 
breach of the contract of employment as well as breach of statutory duty, but conducting the cases only on 
the basis of the common law. Instead, the joint judgment indicated that the scope of the duty which the 
employer owed to the employee could not be properly determined without taking into account the obligations 
which the parties owed to each other under the contract of employment as well as under any applicable 
statutory provisions, including both industrial instruments and legislation such as the anti-discrimination 
legislation. It is only when the contractual position between the parties, including the implied duty of trust 
and confidence between them,
20
 is explored fully together with the relevant statutory framework that it is 
possible to give appropriate content to the duty of reasonable care upon which an employee claiming 
damages for psychiatric injury at work would seek to rely.
21
 This includes the answers to a range of 
questions, including: 
 
o  Is the employer bound to engage additional workers to help a distressed employee? 
o  If the contract of employment stipulates the work which the employee is to be paid to do, may 
the employee's pay be reduced if the employee's work is reduced in order to avoid the risk of 
psychiatric injury? 
o  What is the employer to do if the employee does not wish to vary the contract of employment? 
o  Do different questions arise in cases where the employee's duties are fixed in a contract of 
employment from those that arise where an employee's duties may be varied by mutual 
agreement or at the will of the employer? 
o  If the employee is known to be at risk of psychiatric injury, may the employer dismiss the 
employee rather than continue to run the risk? 
o  Would dismissing the employee contravene general anti-discrimination legislation? 
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In other words, questions about the scope and content of the common law duty of care should not be settled 
until a full appreciation of the relationship between the parties in its proper context is obtained. This is done 
by also taking into account the other aspects delineating that relationship, including rights and obligations 
voluntarily conferred or assumed, as well as those implied, under the contract of employment, as well as the 
legislative framework designed to ensure, for example, safety and equal opportunity in the workplace. 
Appropriate content may then be attributed to the duty of reasonable care on which an employee claiming 
damages for psychiatric injury at work may seek to rely. 
 
There is a sense of restoration of personal responsibility in that part of the court's judgment dealing with the 
tortious duty of care. The trial court's judgment in this respect may be seen as an instance of a failure to 
properly recognise elements of the negligence equation. This phenomenon has previously been identified by, 
for example, McHugh J in Tame v New South Wales,
22
 where his Honour referred to a previous tendency of 
trial courts to find that a duty had been breached merely where the risk of injury was foreseeable without 
fully considering the other essential question, namely whether a reasonable person would have taken 
precautions in the circumstances. The result was to make the plaintiff's task easier to achieve.  
 
The failing here was slightly different. Instead of reasonable foreseeability that the relevant circumstances 
might create the risk of psychiatric illness, the trial court held that it was sufficient for liability that the 
defendant know or ought to know of the relevant circumstances, in the form of overwork, since such 
knowledge was assumed to carry with it reasonable foreseeability of the risk of psychiatric illness. Naturally, 
this approach to foreseeability made it easier for the plaintiff to make her case, thereby passing responsibility 
for her illness to her employer, presumably a deep pocketed defendant. 
 
It stands to reason that many employers will be aware of the circumstances in which their employees are 
working without realising without more that those circumstances might be having a psychologically 
detrimental effect. The unfairness associated with equating foreseeability of circumstances with 
foreseeability of risk of psychiatric illness lies in the fact that unlike many physical injuries, the chief means 
of detecting most psychiatric injuries is through information provided by the individual. The situation 
becomes even more problematic when that individual is voluntarily performing the work, perhaps with a 
view to reward and/or advancement, and might be reluctant to volunteer that it is having a detrimental effect. 
The trial court's approach to foreseeability therefore has the potential to unfairly require defendant employers 
7 
 
to be mind readers by assuming that they have knowledge of the risk of psychiatric illness based only on 
their knowledge of the relevant circumstances. 
 
Whereas the District Court's approach overly favoured plaintiffs, following the High Court's decision in 
Koehler  plaintiffs now face a substantial challenge in showing that in the circumstances the defendant ought 
to have reasonably foreseen the risk of psychiatric illness from workplace stress. The High Court itself 
thought it significant that when the plaintiff in Koehler  was first medically treated both she and her 
physician thought that she was suffering a physical rather than psychiatric condition.
23
 It would seem that the 
clearest way for the plaintiff to meet his or her burden in this regard will be to show that after being assigned 
a certain workload he or she actually suffered a recognisable psychiatric illness and on recovery was given 
the same workload.
24
 In other cases the signs that the plaintiff is suffering a psychiatric illness will need to be 
overt to the employer, or to an officer of the employer of sufficient authority in the case of a substantial 
organisation.
25
 A plaintiff may be prepared voluntarily to share with the employer the fact that he or she was 
undergoing treatment for a psychiatric illness, although even in today's more enlightened times some may 
feel a stigma attached to such a revelation. Indicia such as a change in personality may suffice in some cases, 
but in others may be open to differing interpretation by observers. Further, some individuals may be able to 
continue working without any apparent sign of prolonged depression, anxiety state or other psychiatric 
condition he or she might be suffering. Nevertheless, there may be some circumstances that involve an 
inherent risk to the psychological health of employees. In such a case, the employer may have a duty, where 
possible and appropriate, to perform some form of screening to determine whether the employee's 
personality is such that he or she ought or ought not to be undertaking the work, properly prepare the 
employee for the work whether in the form of training, provision of information or otherwise, and/or monitor 
the state of the employee's mental health.
26
 
 
3.  Bullying: A different context for psychiatric injury at work 
Koehler v Cerebos dealt with a situation where the psychiatric injury results from work which is authorised 
under the contract of employment. Does the case have implications for cases involving psychiatric injury 
resulting from conduct or behaviour which is outside the terms of employment, including bullying 
behaviour?
27
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New South Wales v Mannall 
In New South Wales v Mannall
28
 the plaintiff was employed by the Department of Housing. She was 
promoted to the position of district officer at its Wagga Wagga office, answering to one Singh, the area 
manager stationed at the same office, who in turn reported to the regional director based at regional head 
office in Orange. The plaintiff was appointed in preference to an incumbent, who was aggrieved and who 
subsequently unsuccessfully appealed against the decision. The plaintiff found herself working alongside not 
only the previous incumbent, who had remained at the Wagga Wagga office at an inferior grade, but also a 
group of his supporters.  
 
The plaintiff alleged that she was subsequently subjected to a prolonged campaign of 'victimisation, 
harassment, humiliation and abuse'. This included being addressed in a demeaning and belittling way in front 
of others by Singh, insinuations by Singh that she had been favoured in her promotion, being shunned by 
staff of the Wagga Wagga office, being left out of meetings, having changes made to her team without being 
consulted and generally experiencing a lack of support from Singh as her superior. She recorded her 
complaint about the 'hostile environment' in the office in a letter to Singh, which she copied to the regional 
director. The regional director later wrote to Singh directing him to respond to the staff disharmony in the 
Wagga Wagga office. The plaintiff claimed that notwithstanding this direction and an apology from Singh, 
the belittling of her at meetings and elsewhere continued. At one stage the regional director telephoned her to 
say he was worried about her mental health. Eighteen months after the plaintiff's appointment the department 
appointed a consultant expert in human resources management to advise on the situation. However, the 
plaintiff by that stage was too incapacitated by an anxiety depressive disorder to resume work. 
 
The NSW Court of Appeal
29
 upheld the finding that the defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence 
of Singh. There were unchallenged findings that Singh's responses had been tardy, unreasonably inadequate 
and sometimes entirely lacking when instead what was required was positive intervention in response to 
particular situations.
30
 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the most Singh should have foreseen 
was that the plaintiff was being subjected to stress that was an inevitable concomitant of everyday life, 
particularly the life of a work supervisor, rather than a recognisable psychiatric illness.
31
 It was true that there 
were times when the plaintiff kept up a reasonable facade at work as she struggled to cope, and that Singh's 
capacity to detect stressors likely to result in psychiatric injury was not to be measured as if he were a 
medical specialist. However Singh was a manager who knew that the plaintiff needed and was entitled to 
expect his assistance and cooperation.
32
 Indeed, Singh was actually aware that at the critical times the 
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plaintiff was not coping and was at risk of suffering psychiatric injury as a result of the hostile work 
environment in which she found herself. 
 
The court held that this case did not involve the same 'fallacy' as that exposed in Koehler, where the trial 
judge was regarded as having failed to give due regard to the particular contractual arrangements when 
deciding that there had been negligence on the part of the employer in circumstances in which no reasonable 
employer would have foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury to the employee. Here there was evidence of the 
employer, through its manager, having actual notice of the plaintiff's mental breakdown. Merely because the 
plaintiff entered into a contract of employment as team leader did not mean that the defendant no longer 
owed a general duty of care as the employer. Neither did it relieve the employer, through its manager, from 
having any responsibility for the mental well-being of its employee as both the expected and unexpected 
pressures of the job visibly began to take a toll on her.
33 
 
The consultant's report demonstrated that there were reasonably practicable means of avoiding the 
foreseeable risk available to the employer. Such measures as were recommended by the consultant were 
likely to have been effective in preventing the damage suffered by the plaintiff had they been implemented 
before it was too late. Singh's unreasonable failure to take such measures was held to have materially 
contributed to the plaintiff's mental breakdown and the damage she suffered.
34
 
 
Foreseeability of bullying 
A problem that arises with Mannall as a pointer for future bullying cases is the fact that the manager in that 
case was actually aware of the bullying behaviour exhibited by the company's employees towards the 
plaintiff. More problematic may be cases where there is no actual knowledge of such behaviour.
35 
 
There are some distinctions to be drawn between bullying cases on the one hand and stress cases on the 
other. In the case of stress from overwork, as pointed out in Koehler, there is difficulty associated with 
making performance of the work subject to qualifications such as external industry standards or danger to 
health. The employee may agree to undertake the overwork, perhaps with a view to reward and/or 
advancement. By contrast, it seems that widespread concern at bullying in the workplace took hold in society 
in the second half of the 1990s, with unions insisting on industrial awards which required employers to 
develop policies which were designed to handle claims of bullying, harassment and victimisation in the 
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workplace.
36
 No employment agreement is likely to authorise it as a feature of the employment, nor is an 
employee likely to agree voluntarily to be subjected to it. There is now widespread understanding of bullying 
and its significance as well as the widespread adoption of anti-bullying protocols and policies -- sometimes 
zero tolerance protocols and policies -- in workplaces, which may be incorporated into employment 
contracts. It is reasonable to suggest that an employer should be regarded as being able reasonably to foresee 
that any workplace may be the setting for bullying behaviour and that any employee may suffer psychiatric 
injury as a result of that behaviour.  
 
Accordingly, unlike most stress cases
37
 it might be argued that in most if not all cases of bullying in the 
workplace, foreseeability -- even when cast in terms of being 'not insignificant' in accordance with recent tort 
reform legislation
38
 -- should not be a difficult test to satisfy. Naturally, this does not mean that the employer 
will necessarily be liable in all cases since, apart from anything else, it must be shown that a reasonable 
employer would have taken precautions which would have avoided the damage resulting from the bullying in 
the circumstances. This may be an important consideration when the bullying is subtle in form, and perhaps 
kept concealed from even fellow workers. In addition the plaintiff must show that as a result he or she 
suffered damage in the form of a recognised psychiatric illness rather than any of the array of other responses 
to bullying such as mere discomfort, upset or annoyance. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The decree in the joint judgment in Koehler of a change in practice in the case of claims for psychiatric 
injury in the workplace, requiring courts to determine the extent of the common law duty by taking into 
account the contractual relationship and relevant statutory duties, should lead to a richer understanding of the 
relationship between the particular employer and employee, although no doubt at extra cost in terms of court 
time, effort and money. While such a change in general approach may apply consistently to different types of 
workplace claims, there may still be differences. The test of foreseeability in stress claims requires 
foreseeability of not only the stressor, such as a heavy workload, but also the risk of the employee suffering 
psychiatric injury. Setting aside cases where such a risk may be regarded as inherent, this may be a difficult 
burden for the plaintiff to discharge when the same workload in kind and amount may be manageable for one 
worker but oppressive for another. By contrast, nowadays knowledge of the risk of bullying in any 
workplace and of its potential to cause long lasting psychological damage is widespread in the community. It 
is commonly the subject of policies and industrial awards, and highly unlikely to be permitted even under 
individually negotiated workplace agreements. It is suggested, therefore, that the risk of psychiatric injury 
from bullying be regarded as readily foreseeable by all employers. 
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